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Abstract—The emergence of social and technological net-
works has enabled rapid sharing of data and information.
This has resulted in significant privacy concerns where private
information can be either leaked or inferred from public
data. The problem is significantly harder for social networks
where we may reveal more information to our friends than to
strangers. Nonetheless, our private information can still leak to
strangers as our friends are their friends and so on. In order
to address this important challenge, in this paper, we present
a privacy-preserving mechanism that enables private data to
be diffused over a network. In particular, whenever a user
wants to access another users’ data, the proposed mechanism
returns a differentially private response that ensures that the
amount of private data leaked depends on the distance between
the two users in the network. While allowing global statistics
to be inferred by users acting as analysts, our mechanism
guarantees that no individual user, or a group of users, can
harm the privacy guarantees of any other user. We illustrate
our mechanism with two examples: one on synthetic data where
the users share their GPS coordinates; and one on a Facebook
ego-network where a user shares her infection status.
I. INTRODUCTION
In the era of social networks, individuals’ profiles include
an increasing amount of private information. Besides users’
intention to share this information for social interaction, their
private data enables systems such as location-based services
and collaborative recommender engines, that is, systems that
are not part of their friendship network. Therefore, although
users consent to share their private data with their friends,
when this is not the case, severe privacy concerns are raised.
Traditionally, these privacy concerns are mitigated by
restricting access rights (e.g. on Facebook); more precisely,
only users indicated as friends are granted access to each
user’s personal information. However, such an approach has
severe limitations as follows: first, this scheme is inflexible
since users cannot be partitioned into exactly two groups,
i.e. friends and strangers. Instead, privacy concerns gradually
increase from family members and friends, to acquaintances,
and finally, strangers. Second, a scheme based on access
rights keeps private information local, which limits the ability
of inferring statistics of the whole network. For instance,
consider network analysts who are interested in statistics over
the whole population of the social network such as population
density maps and epidemic monitoring. This limits the utility
of the network. Hence, an alternative mechanism that allows
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global statistics on the whole population and respecting
individuals’ privacy is needed.
Frameworks for providing privacy guarantees are differ-
ential privacy [1] and information theoretic privacy [2]. How-
ever, most of the previous approaches in both frameworks do
not consider variable privacy levels in a network, where the
level of privacy depends on friendship distance. Hereafter, we
consider a network where users wish to share their private
data under privacy guarantees, where the strength of these
guarantees is quantified by the distance on the graph. Within
the context of a social network, users wish to communicate
accurate information with little privacy guarantees to their
close friends, whereas, they desire strong privacy guarantees
whenever their private data is communicated to distant areas
of the network. From the network analyst’s point of view,
statistics over the whole network need to be possible while
ensuring the privacy guarantees.
Multiple privacy-preserving frameworks that formalize
privacy guarantees have appeared in the literature, e.g. [2],
[3]. Commonly, privacy-preserving approaches add artificial
noise to the accessed private data. This noise is designed
such that the resulting response conveys little information
about the private data. Specifically, an information-theoretic
approach [2] constrains the mutual information between the
private data and the released signal. Similarly, differential
privacy [3], [1] requires that the statistics of the noisy
response should be almost independent of perturbations of
the private data. In this work, we adopt the framework of
differential privacy because of its strong privacy guarantees,
yet the underlying problem can be formulated under other
privacy frameworks.
Within differential privacy, an extensive family of
privacy-preserving mechanisms has emerged. The applica-
tion range of these mechanisms varies from solving lin-
ear problems [4], [5], distributed convex optimization [6],
Kalman filtering [7], and consensus that protects the network
topology [8] to smart metering [9], [10] and traffic flow
estimation [11]. In particular, the problems introduced in the
aforementioned line of research share a common underlying
abstract problem that can be stated as follows: given the
private data and a predefined privacy requirement, we need to
design a differentially private algorithm, called mechanism,
which accurately approximates a desired quantity. Then,
a single sample from the mechanism is published and is
used as a proxy for the exact response, so, a curious user
cannot confidently infer the original private data. Instead of
considering a single privacy level and assuming that the
response are publicly released, i.e. everyone receives the
same response, in this paper, we consider the novel problem
of assigning different privacy levels for different users. More-
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over, contrary to publishing the responses, we assume that
they are securely communicated to each user. Therefore, the
aforementioned works do not address the problem introduced
here. Furthermore, in [12], [13], multi-component private
data and different privacy levels for different components are
considered, i.e. in a user’s profile, typically, stronger privacy
is required for the component representing salary compared
to that of age. Contrary to previous works that focus on
variable privacy for different components of one’s data, our
paper focuses on different privacy levels that depend on
friendship status. The work closest to ours is [14], where the
problem of relaxing the privacy level after e.g. supplementary
payments to the owners of the sensitive data. Although some
of the tools in [14] are leveraged to provide a solution,
here, we consider a different problem which is the problem
of releasing sensitive data to multiple parties with different
privacy levels and has not been studied before.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II informally
describes the problem of diffusing private data across a
network, then, provides a model of the system, reviews
differential privacy, and derives a formal statement of the
problem. Section III introduces a composite mechanism
based on a Markov stochastic process and presents low-
complexity algorithmic implementations of this mechanism.
We demonstrate our approach with two illustrative examples
in Section IV, one on synthetic network where a user releases
her GPS coordinates and one on a Facebook ego-network
where a user shares her infection status.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
Here, the problem of releasing private information over
networks (i.e. social networks) is formulated. First, we pro-
vide an informal description of the problem whose formal
statements are presented in Problem 1 and Problem 2 in
the end of this section. Let a network be represented as
a graph G = (V, E), where each node i ∈ V is a user
and each edge (i, j) ∈ E represents a friendship relation
between users i and j. Also, we assume that each user i
owns a private data ui ∈ U , where U is the set of possible
private data, and wishes to share their private data with
the rest of the users under privacy guarantees. Specifically,
user i generates an approximation yij of ui and securely
communicates yij to user j. More specifically, each user i
requires her data ui to be (dij)-differential privacy against
user j (differential privacy is overviewed in Subsection II-B),
where dij is a distance function dij : V × V → R+ and
 : R+ → R+ is a decreasing function that converts distance
d to a privacy level (d). Therefore, we need to design
a mechanism that generates accurate∗ responses {yij}j∈V
while satisfying different privacy constraints for different
recipients based on the distance on the network.
In order to formalize these statements as in Problem 1
and, eventually, in Problem 2, we need to revisit some
concepts and known results. Subsequently, modeling assump-
tions are presented in Subsection II-A, whereas differential
∗Here, accuracy is meant in the expected mean-squared error sense.
privacy is briefly reviewed in II-B. We present a conventional
approach, i.e. a scheme based on access rights in Subsection
II-C, whereas Subsection II-D formally presents the problem
of diffusing private data over networks.
A. System Model
Consider a network represented as a graph G with
|V| = N nodes. For simplicity, we assume that the graph
is undirected and unweighted, although this assumption can
be removed. Each node i ∈ V represents a user and
(i, j) ∈ E ⊆ V×V represents the friendship relation between
users i and j. Each user owns a private data ui ∈ U . Typical
examples of private data include:
1) Timestamps: let ui ∈ R be a real-valued representation
of a timestamp such as date of birth, e.g. Unix time [15]
is a popular way of mapping timestamps to integers;
2) Location: let ui ∈ R2 be the GPS coordinates of the
residence of an individual i;
3) Binary states: let ui ∈ {0, 1} indicate user’s i status
such as infected or healthy, married or single etc.
Further, we want the severity of the privacy concerns to scale
with the distance between two nodes. Typical choices for the
distance function d : V × V → R+ are as follows:
1) Shortest path distance: let dij be the length of the
shortest path connecting nodes i and j;
2) Resistance distance: let dij be the resistance between
nodes i and j, where the edges of graph G are
associated with unit resistors [16].
A more extended model can incorporate additional infor-
mation such as family relationships. Further, directed edges
(e.g. blocked users) can be also be allowed in social network
scenarios.
B. Differential Privacy
Differential privacy is a formal framework that provides
rigorous privacy guarantees. Differentially private algorithms
add noise in order to make it hard for a curious user to infer
whether someone’s data has been used in the computation.
The dependency of this noisy response on the private data is
required to be bounded, as formally stated in Definition 1.
The strength of this bound is quantified by the non-negative
parameter  ∈ [0,∞), called privacy level, where smaller
values of  imply stronger privacy guarantees. Moreover, an
adjacency relation A is a symmetric binary relation over the
set of private data U which includes the pairs of private
data (u, u′) that should be rendered almost indistinguishable.
Further, a mechanism† Q : U → ∆ (Y) is a randomized map
from the space of private data to the space of responses.
Definition 1 (Differential Privacy [1]). Let  > 0, U be the
space of private data, and A ⊆ U × U be an adjacency
†For a set T and a rich-enough σ-algebra T on it, we denote the set of
all probability measures on (T, T ) with ∆(T ). Specifically, for Euclidean
spaces T = Rn, we consider the Borel’s σ-algebra.
relation. The mechanism Q : U → ∆ (Y) is -differential
privacy if:
P(Qu ∈ S) ≤ e P(Qu′ ∈ S), for all S ⊆ Y,
for all adjacent inputs (u, u′) ∈ A.
In this work, we consider real-valued private data U = Rn
and the following adjacency relation:
(u, u′) ∈ A2 ⇔ ‖u− u′‖2 ≤ α, (1)
where α ∈ R+ is a small constant. Practically, adjacency
relation A2 requires that, given the output of mechanism
Q, a curious user should not be able to infer the private
input u within a radius of α. A popular differentially private
mechanism is the Laplace mechanism which is near-optimal
[17], [10], is used as a building block for many mechanisms,
and is described next.
Theorem 2 (Laplace Mechanism [1]). Consider the mecha-
nism Q : Rn → ∆ (Rn) that adds Laplace distributed noise:
Qu = u+ V, where V ∼ Lap
(α

)
,
where Lap(b) has density P(V = v) = e−
‖v‖2
b . Then, mecha-
nism Q is -differential private under adjacency relation A2.
C. Access Rights Scheme
Now, we describe a typical approach for handling privacy
concerns in social network while highlighting its limitations
and motivating the need for a more sophisticated privacy-
aware approach. Figure 1a shows a synthetic network with
150 nodes, where the starred node wishes to share her
sensitive information with the rest of the network. Privacy
concerns can be handled by regulating access privileges. For
example, friends of a user can access her data, whereas every
other user cannot. Such a scheme has limitations. On one
hand, users are coarsely partitioned to friends and strangers
as depicted in Figure 1a; friends of the star-labeled user are
colored white whereas strangers are colored black. Instead,
the distance between two users can be more finely quantified
by a real-valued function. On the other hand, each user has
access only to neighboring information. Although restrict-
ing access rights settles privacy concerns, computing global
statistics on the network is impossible, limiting the utility
of the network. Indeed, any estimator of global quantities
(mean value, histogram etc.) will be biased. Therefore, users
may choose to collaborate, merge their local information, and
damage any privacy guarantees. Figure 1b overcomes these
limitations by defining a distance function d : V × V → R+
which quantifies the strength of the privacy concerns. In this
case, users share privacy-aware versions of their profile with
every member of the network.
D. Diffusing Sensitive Information over a Social Network
Under the modeling introduced in Subsection II-A, we
pose the problem of designing a mechanism that diffuses
private data over a network in the following.
(a) An access right scheme. (b) A distance-based scheme.
Fig. 1: A synthetic network with 150 nodes and 1256 edges is
shown. Each node represents a user of the network and each edge
indicates a friendship. The user indicated with the star wishes to
share her sensitive information with the rest of the network. Privacy
concerns can be addressed by managing access privileges. Under
an access right scheme (Figure 1a), only friends of the starred user
(blue nodes) are granted access to the exact information, whereas
any other member (red nodes) have no access. Such a scheme parti-
tions users to only two groups; friends and strangers. Moreover, each
user has access only to local information and cannot estimate the
global state of the network. Therefore, any estimator constructed by
the diamond user will be independed of the data of the starred user
and, thus, biased. On the other hand, Figure 1b proposes an approach
where users’ privacy concerns scale with the distance from others.
Friends (lighter-colored nodes) receive a less noisy versions of the
private data, whereas strangers (darker-colored nodes) receive only
heavily perturbed versions. Despite the increased noise, estimates
of aggregate statistics are possible. However, coalitions might be
encouraged and initial privacy guarantees can quickly degrade. For
example, users within the circle can combine their estimates and
infer the private data of the starred user.
Problem 1. Design a privacy-aware mechanism
Q : U → ∆ (UN) that privately releases user’s i sensitive
data ui ∈ U over a social network. Specifically, design
mechanism Q that generates N responses {yj}Nj=1, where
yij is the securely communicated response to user j. Further,
for the adjacency relation (1) (where, for simplicity, α = 1),
the mechanism Q needs to satisfy the following properties:
• Variable Privacy: The mechanism must generate the
response yij for private data ui which (dij)-differential
private.
• Optimal Utility: Response yij must be an accurate
approximation of the sensitive data ui, i.e. for real-
valued private data, it should minimize the expected
squared-error
EQ‖yij − ui‖22.
Specifically, whenever individual i shares her sensitive
information to another individual j, she requires (dij)-
differential privacy, where (·) : R+ → R+ is a decreasing
function that coverts a distance d to a privacy level (d).
People residing close (w.r.t. a distance) to individual i receive
a loose privacy constraint ij  1, whereas strangers get
noisier versions ij  1.
Problem 1 admits a straightforward but unsatisfying ap-
proach. Let yij = ui + V , where V ∼ Lap
(
(dij)
−1),
independently for each user j ∈ V . Subsequently, a group
of users j ∈ A ⊆ U have the incentive to collaborate share
their estimates {yij}j∈A in order to derive a more accurate
estimator yA of ui described by
yA =
∑
j∈A
wjyij .
Figure 1b depicts a group of users forming such a coalition.
The possibly large group A resides far away from the user
indicated by the star, dij  1,∀j ∈ A. Although each
user j in the group A receives a highly noisy estimate of
ui, estimator yA is more accurate. The composition theorem
of differential privacy [1] guarantees only
(∑
j∈A (dij)
)
-
privacy which can be rather looser than each of the (dij)-
privacy guarantees; larger values of  imply less privacy.
Therefore, Problem 1 is subject to coalition attacks. Thus,
we restate Problem 1 by requiring that any group A that
exchanges their estimates {yij}j∈A cannot produce a better
estimator of ui than the best estimator among the group yij∗ ,
where j∗ = arg minj∈A dij is the user closest to user i. This
problem can be stated as follows:
Problem 2. Design a privacy-aware mechanism
Q : U → ∆ (UN) that releases a approximation of user’s i
sensitive data ui ∈ U over a social network. Specifically,
mechanismM generates N responses {yij}Nj=1 and securely
communicates response yij to user j. Mechanism Q needs
to satisfy:
• Privacy: For any group of users A ⊆ V , response
{yij}j∈A must be maxj∈A (dij)-differential private.
• Performance: Response yij must be an accurate approx-
imation of the sensitive data ui.
III. MAIN RESULTS
In this section, we approach the problem of diffusing
private data over a network. Subsection III-A derives the
needed theoretical results and establishes that the accuracy of
each estimate yij depends only on the distance dij . Moreover,
algorithmic implementations of the composite mechanism
Q should scale for vast social networks. Subsection III-B
provides algorithmic implementations of the mechanism Q
with complexity O
(
ln
(
maxi,j∈V (dij)
mini,j∈V (dij)
))
.
A. A Private Stochastic Process
For n-dimensional real-valued private data u ∈ Rn, we
derive a composite mechanism that generates the response yij
that user j receives as an approximation of user’s i private
data ui. This mechanism has the following two properties.
First, the accuracy of the response yij depends solely on the
distance dij between nodes i and j. Specifically, the expected
squared-error in Equation (2) does not depend on any other
parameters of the network (e.g. size, topology) or the rest
of the responses {yik}k∈V\{j}. Second, any group of users
A ⊆ V that decides to collaborate and share their responses
{yij}j∈A cannot infer anything more about user’s i private
data. Algorithmic aspects of the composite mechanism are
deferred until Subsection III-B.
E
(‖yij − ui‖22) = n(n+ 1)(dij)2 , (2)
where  : R+ → R+ is a decreasing function which converts
distance d to a privacy level (d). Then, Theorem 3 introduces
the underlying composite mechanism.
Theorem 3. Let dij ∈ R+ denote the distance between users
i and j, and ui ∈ R be the private data of user i. Consider
the mechanism Q that generates the responses:
yij = ui + V
(i)
(dij)
,
where {V (i) }>0 is a sample of a Markov stochastic process
{V}>0. Then, mechanism Q provides a solution to Prob-
lem 2. In particular, it has the following properties:
• The variance of response yij is n (n+ 1) (dij)−2 and,
thus, depends only on the distance between users i and
j.
• For any subset of users A ⊆ V , the mechanism
that releases the responses {yij}j∈A is
(
max
j∈V
(dij)
)
-
differential private.
The proof of Theorem 3 is presented in Appendix A. The
main idea is introducing correlation between the responses
{yij}j∈V . For n = 1, the stochastic process {V} has
closed-form expressions, whereas, for n > 1, closed-form
expressions are derived only for the infinitesimal increments
V+d − V. Nonetheless, we derive handles that allow for
exact (in the sense that we do not use approximations of the
process) and efficient (in the algorithmic complexity sense)
sampling of the process. Furthermore, our proof techniques
are robust and can possibly be applied beyond the Laplace
mechanism; for example, the K-norm mechanism [18] that
appears in a different setting than the one considered here.
Figure 2 pictures two samples of the stochastic process
{V}>0, for n = 2, in polar coordinates and shows that
the process is a jump process; i.e., with high probability, the
process is constant in small intervals. Figure 3 pictures two
samples of the process in high dimensions. The process is
again lazy, yet, the jumps are more often.
A major consequence of Theorem 3 is that mechanism
Q does not incentivize coalitions. Specifically, consider a
group of curious users A ⊆ V who wish to estimate ui more
accurately and, thus, collaborate and share their knowledge
{yij}j∈A. In practice, such a group can be fake accounts of
a single but distant (in the sense of d) user. Then, given this
shared knowledge, the best estimator is:
uˆi = yij∗ |j∗∈arg minj∈A dij .
Therefore, user j∗ is not benefited by such a coalition and,
thus, she has no incentive to participate in the coalition and
share her information yij∗ .
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Fig. 2: Two samples of the two-dimensional process which is the
underlying object for diffusing private GPS coordinates over a
network.
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Fig. 3: The `2-norm of two samples of the stochastic process
{V}>0 in high-dimensions (n = 20) which can be used to diffused
private signals over networks, such as power consumption in smart
grids.
B. Algorithmic Implementation
Sampling from a continuous-domain stochastic process
can often be performed only approximately. For example,
consider the Brownian motion {Bt}t∈[0,1] which, for sam-
pling purposes, requires storing an infimum of real values.
Contrary to Brownian motion, the private process {V}>0
rarely changes value and is, thus, lazy. More formally,
restricted to a sufficiently small interval [1, 2], the stochas-
tic process {V}∈[1,2] is constant with high probability.
Furthermore, assuming the existence of an algorithm for
computing the distance dij , the response yij can be generated
during run-time. This property is crucial, since it circumvents
the O
(
N2
)
memory requirements of a static implementation.
Proposition 4 characterizes the distribution of the number of
jumps in a bounded interval.
Proposition 4. The number of jumps that the process
{V}>0 performs in the interval [1, 2] is Poisson distributed
with mean value (n+ 1) ln
(
2
1
)
.
P (k jumps in [1, 2]) =
xk
k!
e−x,
where x = (n+ 1) ln
(
2
1
)
.
Corollary 5. Process {V}>0 performs E[k] = (n+ 1) ln 2
jumps (in expectation, with variance Var[k] = (n + 1) ln 2)
for every doubling of the privacy level, i.e. in the interval
[, 2].
This laziness renders samples from the process highly-
compressible. Indeed, given the locations {(i)}ki=1 of the
jumps and the values‡ {V

(i)
−
}ki=1 near those points a sample
can be exactly reconstructed. The number k of jumps over
a bounded interval [1, 2] is itself a random variable and
captures the memory needs of our approach.
Furthermore, Proposition 4 suggests an efficient algorithm
for directly sampling from the process {V}∈[1,2], which
we present in Algorithm 1. Algorithm 1 draws a sample
{v}∈[1,2] from the stochastic process V over a bounded
interval  ∈ [1, 2]. This sample {v} is the main object that
performs diffusion of private data; whenever a user j requests
user’s i private data ui residing dij away, the estimator
yij = ui + v(dij).
The algorithm initializes a trace of the process by sam-
pling from the Laplace distribution. Then, the algorithm
extends this trace backwards in  by sampling for the location
of the next jump. The logarithm of the positions where jumps
occur define a Poisson process with rate λ = n+1 and, thus,
the length δ = ln (i)− ln (i+1) of the interval until the next
jump is exponentially distributed with density δ ∼ λe−λ δ.
Finally, conditioned on the event of a jump at (i), the size
δv = V

(i)
−
− V

(i)
+
of the jump is “Bessel”- distributed with
parameter 1
(i)
. The algorithm recycles until the level 1
is reached. Additionally, responses yij are generated upon
request, and, thus, there is no excessive memory requirement
O(N2) for storing all the responses {yij}i,j∈V . The number
of iterations that Algorithm 1 performs is a random variable
and is characterized by Proposition 4.
Typical single-dimensional (n = 1) private data are
date of birth, salary, and health status. For n = 2, our
results are applicable to geo-indistinguishability [19] which
is differential privacy for GPS locations and is experimentally
illustrated in Subsection IV-A. Finally, the case n → ∞
appeals to private signals that appear in filtering problems
and smart grid applications.
For completeness, Table I presents the parameterization of
the elementary distributions used by the proposed algorithms.
We note that the Bessel distribution decays exponentially and
has closed-form expressions for odd n. Nonetheless, it is a
‡We use the notation V− = limτ↑ Vτ and V+ = limτ↓ Vτ .
Distribution Param. Supp. Density
Laplace β > 0 x ∈ R 12β e−
|x|
β
Exponential λ > 0 x ∈ R+ λe−λx
Gamma
n ∈ N,
β > 0
x ∈ R+ 1Γ(n)βnxn−1e−
x
β
Bessel
n ∈ N,
β > 0
x ∈ R+
4
Γ(n2 )(2β)
n
2
+1
x
n
2Kn
2−1
(
x
β
)
TABLE I: The distributions that are used by Algorithm 1. Sampling
from these distributions can be performed using a uniform random
variable and the quantile function.
single-dimensional distribution and, thus, discritization and
sampling through the inverse cumulative function is possible.
Algorithm 1 Sampling from the stochastic process V over
a bounded interval  ∈ [1, 2] can be performed both
efficiently (with complexity O
(
ln
(
2
1
))
) and exactly (in the
sense that we are not discretizing the interval or approximat-
ing the procssess).
Require: Dimension n; Privacy levels 1 and 2, such that
2 > 1 > 0.
function SAMPLEPRIVATEPROCESSL2(n, 1, 2)
k ← 1
(1) ← 2
r ∼ Gamma
(
T, 12
)
v
(1)
1 , . . . , v
(1)
n
i.i.d.∼ Gaussian(0, 1)
v(1) ← r‖v(1)‖2 v(1)
while (k) > 1 do
δ ∼ Exponential(n+ 1)
(k+1) ← e−δ (k)
r ∼ Bessel (n2 − 1, 1(k+1) )
δv1, . . . , δvn
i.i.d.∼ Gaussian(0, 1)
δv ← r‖δv‖2 δv
v(k+1) ← v(k) + δv
k ← k + 1
end while
Return {((i), v(i)}ki=1
end function
IV. ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLES
We present two application that depict diffusion of private
data over a network. These example shows that bits of private
information can be spread over the whole network, which
allows users to estimate global quantities, such as epidemic
spreading, while providing strong privacy guarantees.
A. Synthetic Data
We consider the synthetic network in Figure 5 with N =
|V| = 150 nodes and |E| = 1256 edges, where edges are
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Fig. 4: Agent i uses Algorithm 1 with n = 2 and generates a
single sample of the stochastic process. For small values of privacy
level, high noise values are more likely, whereas, for loose privacy
levels ( → ∞), the noise values decrease in magnitude. Despite
the continuity of the domain  ∈ [0,∞), the process performs only
a few jumps.
formed based on proximity. Each user i ∈ {1, . . . , N} wishes
to publish her vector-valued private data ui ∈ R2, such as
her GPS coordinates. For simplicity, we focus on a single
user; our technique can be applied independently for each
user. The distance dij between users i and j is captured by
the shortest path length. We choose an exponential function
(·) that converts distances dij ∈ {1, . . . , 9} to privacy levels
(dij) ∈ [.5, 15].
Algorithm 1 is executed by user i for n = 2 and the norms
of several traces are shown in Figure 4. For tight values of
privacy level (→ 0), large amounts of noises are added. In
Figure 5, nodes are colored based on the accuracy ‖yij−ui‖2
of the response yij they receive.
Although we have assumed the existence of a secure
communication channel between any two users of the net-
work and the existence of a central authority which com-
putes the distances dij , an implementation that assumes
only local communication between neighboring users and
an honest-but-curious model is possible. In such an im-
plementation, user i sends to all her neighbors the signal
{ui + V}∈(0,(1)). Then, each user j receives the signal
{u+ V}∈[0,(dij)), trims it to {u+ V}∈[0,(dij+1)), and
broadcasts it to her friends.
B. Real Dataset: Facebook
In this section, we present an application of diffusing sen-
sitive data on a real network. Specifically, an “ego-network”
[20] is a the sub-graph G = (V ∪ {Alice}, E) of Facebook
induced by a single user, Alice, and her friends V . Figure 7
plots such an ego-network, where the bottom-left node is
the user whose neighborhood is captured. The rest of the
nodes represent Alice’s friends, edges represent friendships
between her friends, whereas, the edges between Alice and
her friends are omitted for clarity. We assume that Alice’s
infection status is captured by a single bit u ∈ {0, 1}. Then,
Alice wishes to share this information with her friends in a
privacy-preserving way.
For each friend i ∈ V , the distance di is calculated by
a central authority. Values {di}i∈V are independent of the
private data u, and can be computed without any privacy
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Fig. 5: Each individual j gets the value ui + V(dij), where ui is
the true sensitive data, dij is the number of hops between users i
and j, and V is the result of Algorithm 1.
requirements. In particular, values di quantify the strength of
the friendship between Alice and friend i and are evaluated
according to Equation (3).
dij = Γii + Γjj − 2Γij , (3)
where Γ ∈ Rn×n is the pseudo-inverse of the Laplace matrix
L of the network. Due to space limitations, we use the fact
that our technique allows post-processing of the responses
yij and, thus, is applicable for private bits.
Initially, Alice executes Algorithm 1 in order to generate
a single sample {w :  ∈ [
¯
, ¯]} of the stochastic process
{V :  > 0}, where
¯
 (resp. ¯) is a lower (resp. upper)
bound of the quantity min
i∈V
(di) (resp. max
i∈V
(di)). Function
(·) : R+ → R+ is a decreasing function which converts
distances di to privacy levels i = (di). In this example,
we chose (d) = exp(−3.3d + 4) which leads to privacy
levels within [.5, 15]. Next, individual responses are generated
during run-time. Whenever user i requests access to the
sensitive data u, the response yi is securely communicated
to user i:
yi = Π{0,1}(u+ w(di)),
where ΠS is the projection operator on the set S.
Figure 6 depicts two executions of Algorithm 1 with
n = 1, whereas, Figure 7 plots the ego-network centered
around Alice. In particular, Alice is shown on the bottom-left
corner and each friend i is plotted at distance di from her. The
blue and red circles mark the jumps of the stochastic process
for the two samples wblue and w
red
 . Counter-intuitively,
friends i lying within two consecutive blue circles receive
exactly the same response yi although they are assigned dif-
ferent privacy levels (di). The paradox is settled by noticing
that the boundary circles are random variables themselves.
Therefore, users receiving identical responses have different
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
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Fig. 6: Two samples of the stochastic process generated by Algo-
rithm 1. The samples are private information; a malicious user i can
subtract the noise w(di) from the received response yi and exactly
infer the private data u.
Fig. 7: An ego-network is the part of the Facebook network that is
visible from a fixed user A (ego), shown in the bottom-left corner
of the plot. Each friend i is plotted at distance di. The locations of
the jumps of the two samples shown in Figure 6 are depicted by
the blue and red circles. Although users residing within consecutive
circles receive identical responses yi, they are assigned different
privacy levels (di) and, thus, have different confidence levels.
confidence levels.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this work, we considered the case of a network where
each user owns a private data u ∈ Rn such as her salary
or her infection status and wishes to share approximations
of this private data with the rest of the network under
differential privacy guarantees. Specifically, we assumed that
user i requires (dij)-differential privacy against against
user j, where (·) is a decreasing function and dij is the
distance induced by the underlying network between users i
and j. In this context, we derived a composite mechanism
that generates the response yij as user’s j approximation
of user’s i private data. The accuracy of the response yij
depends only on the allocated privacy level (dij) and not
on the size or other parameters of the network. An important
property of our proposed mechanism is the resilience to
coalitions where we considered a group of users combining
their received responses for more accurate approximations.
Practically, this means that scenarios where an adversarial
user creates multiple fake accounts cannot weaken the privacy
guarantees. Algorithms for sampling from this composite
mechanism were also provided. In particular, the complexity
of these algorithms is independent of the size of the network,
which renders them scalable, and is dictated only by the
extreme privacy levels mini∈V (dij) and maxi∈V (dij).
Finally, we provided two illustrative examples: one on a
synthetic network where users communicate their private
GPS locations, and one where a user shares her infection
status with her Facebook ego-network. This work focused
on the privacy aspect of the problem of diffusing private
data over networks. Future work includes the joint problem
of accurately estimating formally-defined global quantities
while preserving privacy of users’ data.
APPENDIX
A. Proof of Theorem 3
Theorem 3 is established in multiple steps. First, we
focus on the discrete-domain process {Vi}mi=1, where
1 ≤ · · · ≤ m and, in particular, on the case of m = 2,
with 1 ≤ 2 <
√
21, where the second inequality is due
to technical reasons. Next, we prove the Markov property
which allows m discrete privacy levels. Finally, we pass to
the limit and derive the continuous-domain process {V}>0
as stated in Theorem 3.
Proof for two privacy levels. We consider the stochastic pro-
cess V supported on two privacy levels {1, 2}, where
1 ≤ 2 <
√
21. Allowing generalized functions, we assume
that the joint distribution of V1 and V2 has density:
P(V1 = x, V2 = y) = l1,2(x, y) = g(x, y), x, y ∈ Rn(4)
Density (4) should satisfy the following marginal distribu-
tions and privacy constraints:∫
Rn
g(x, y)dny = n1C1e
−1‖x‖2 ,∫
Rn
g(x, y)dnx = n2C1e
−2‖y‖2 ,
‖∇xg(x, y) +∇yg(x, y)‖2 ≤ 2g(x, y),
where C1 =
Γ(n2 +1)
pi
n
2 Γ(n+1)
. The first two constraints express that
V1 and V2 should be Laplace-distributed with parameters
1
1
and 12 , respectively. The last constraint enforces that
the mechanism that releases (u+ V1 , u+ V2) must be 2-
private. We solve for densities g of the form
g(x, y) = n2C1φ(x− y)e−2‖y‖2 ,
where φ : Rn → R is a (possibly generalized) function
satisfying∫
Rn
φ(x− u)n2 e−2‖u‖2dnu = n1 e−1‖x‖2 ,∫
Rn
φ(u)dnu = 1.
(5)
The first equation in (5) is a n-dimensional convolution with
solution
Fφ(s) = M(s; 1)M(s; 2) , (6)
where M(s; ) = F {ne−‖x‖2} (s), and s ∈ Rn is the
frequency. Solution (6) satisfies the second equation in (5)
since ∫
Rn
φ(u)dnu = Fφ(s)|s=0 =
M(0; 1)
M(0; 2) = 1.
Finally, we need to prove that, for φ given in (6), density g
is well-defined, specifically:
φ(z) ≥ 0, ∀z ∈ Rn.
This is proven under the assumption that 2 <
√
21;
this assumption will eventually be removed. According to
Lemma 6, we get:
Fφ(s) = M(s; 1)M(s; 2) =
(
1
2
)n+1(
1 +
22 − 21
21 + ρ
2
)n+1
2
=
(
1
2
)n+1 ∞∑
k=0
(n+1
2
k
) 2221 − 1
1 + ρ
2
21
k ,
where ρ = ‖s‖2. The sum in the right-hand side is an infinite
series only when n is even, and, for 2 <
√
21, it converges
uniformly in s to the left-hand side. Lemma 7 can be used
to invert the series:
φ(x) =
(
1
2
)n+1 ∞∑
k=0
(n+1
2
k
)
∗k
{(
22
21
− 1
)
n1 (2pi)
−n2
(1r)
1−n2Kn
2−1(1r)
}
,
(7)
where r = ‖x‖2, Kk(x) is the modified Bessel function of
the second kind, and ∗ is the n-dimensional convolution.
Since 
2
2
21
− 1 ≥ 0 and Kn
2−1(r) ≥ 0, density g is well-
defined.
Next, we prove that the discrete-domain stochastic pro-
cess {Vi}i∈{1,...,m} is Markov.
Proof of the Markov property. Consider the discrete-domain
process {Vi}i∈{1,...,m} supported on m non-decreasing pri-
vacy levels {1, . . . , m}, and the joint distribution that
satisfies the Markov property:
P(Vi = vi, ∀i) = l1:m(v1, . . . , vm)
= P(V1 = v1)
m∏
i=2
P(Vi = vi|Vi−1 = vi−1)
= l1(v1)
m∏
i=2
li−1:i(vi−1, vi)
li(vi)
,
(8)
where l(v) ∝ e−‖v‖2 is the n-dimensional Laplace distri-
bution with parameter −1 and l1,2(v1, v2) is the density
g from the previous proof. Then, the joint distribution l1:m
satisfies the following properties:
• Accuracy: Each coordinate Vi is optimally-distributed,
i.e. Laplace-distributed with parameter −1i :
P(Vi = vk) =
∫
Rn(m−1)
l1:m(v1, . . . , vm)dv−i
= li(vi),
where dv−i = dv1 · · · dvi−1 dvi+1 · · · dvm.
• Privacy: The mechanism that releases {yi}mi=1, where
yi = u+ Vi is m-private. Indeed, the mechanism can
be expressed as:
y1
...
ym−1
ym
 =

u+ V1
...
u+ Vm−1
u+ Vm

= (u+ Vm) +

∑m
i=2 Vi−1 − Vi
...
Vm−1 − Vm
0
 .
Density li−1,i defined in (7) shows that Vi−1 − Vi is
distributed independently of any other random variable.
Thus, the mechanism can be viewed as the composition
of the m-private mechanism that releases u+Vm post-
processed by adding independent noise. Since differen-
tial privacy is resilient to post-processing [1], the overall
mechanism is m-private.
Finally, we derive the continuous domain process
{V}>0 by passing to the limit as the m→∞, 1 = 0, and
→∞. Specifically, we derive closed-form expressions that
lead to efficient algorithms for sampling of the continuous-
domain stochastic process.
Proof of the continuous-domain process. In density (7), let
1 =  and 2 = (1 + δ), where 0 < δ  1. Then, we prove
that we can safely ignore high-order terms:
φ(x) ∝ δ(x) + F−1
{
(n+ 1)δ
1 + ρ
2
2
}
+O
(
δ2
)
(9)
= δ(x) +
n(n+ 1)
(2pi)
n
2
(r)1−
n
2Kn
2−1(r)δ +O
(
δ2
)
,
where r = ‖x‖2. We discretize a bounded interval [, ] by
considering K + 1 points (i) = qi, where q =
(


)K−1
,
and define the random variable Z as follows:
Z := V − V =
K∑
i=1
V(i−1) − V(i) ,
where the random variables {V(i)}Ki=0 form a discrete-
domain stochastic process introduced in (8). For large K,
the step δ = q − 1 becomes arbitrarily small and, thus, we
use the first-order approximation in 9 for each telescoping
term (V(i−1) −V(i)) ∼ φ(i) . Finally, the random variable Z
is distributed as:
Z ∼ ∗Ni=1φ(i)(Z)
= ∗Ni=1
{
δ(Z) +
(
(i)
)n
(n+ 1)
(2pi)
n
2
((i)‖Z‖2)1−n2
Kn
2−1(
(i)‖Z‖2)δ
}
+O (δ) ,
where we let δ → 0. This proves that we can approximate
the continuous-domain stochastic process by a first-order
approximation of the discrete-domain process.
Equation (9) characterizes the stochastic process {V}>0.
The atom renders the stochastic process lazy; with high
probability, the process is constant over sufficiently small
intervals. The linear term governs the statistics of the the
jump.
B. Proof of Proposition 4
We now provide the proof of Proposition 4 that charac-
terizes the jumps of the stochastic process {V}>0 and, thus,
captures the complexity of Algorithm 1.
Proof. Consider the first-order approximation of the back-
wards conditional distribution φ derived in (9), where 0 < 
and 0 < δ  1:
P(V = x|V(1+δ) = y) ≈ (1 + (n+ 1)δ)−1 (10)(
δ(x) +
n(n+ 1)
(2pi)
n
2
(r)1−
n
2Kn
2−1(r)δ
)
Let an(x) denote the probability that the process performs n
jumps in the interval [, ex]. According to (10) shows that,
for sufficiently small intervals [, (1 + δ)], the process re-
mains constant with probability (1 + (n+ 1)δ)−1, therefore,
an(x) is invariant of . Under the discretization introduced
earlier, where ←  and ← ex:
a0(x) = P(0 jumps in [, ex]) = e−(n+1)x.
A limiting argument is used to compute a1(x):
a1(x) = lim
K→∞
K∑
k=1
P
(
0 jumps in [, (k−1)]
)
P
(
1 jump in [(k−1), (k)]
)
P
(
0 jumps in [(k), ex]
)
= (n+ 1)xe−(n+1)x.
A similar argument provides a recurrent equation and even-
tually:
ak(x) =
((n+ 1)x)k
k!
e−(n+1)x. (11)
Therefore, for a bounded interval interval [, ], the number
n of jumps is characterized by distribution (11), which is the
Poisson distribution with mean value (n+ 1) ln
(


)
.
C. Fourier Transform Pairs
In this section, we derive two Fourier pairs used in the
proof of Theorem 3. By convention, the following definition
of Fourier transform f F↔ F is used:
F {f(x)} (s) =
∫
Rn
f(x)e−jx·sdnx,
where f, F : Rn → R.
Lemma 6. The n-dimensional Fourier transform F of f :
Rn → R:
f(x) = e−‖x‖2
is:
F {f(x)} (s) = pi
n
2 Γ(n+ 1)
Γ
(
n
2 + 1
) (1 + ‖s‖22)−n+12 ,
where s ∈ Rn.
Lemma 7. The n-dimensional Fourier transform F of f :
Rn → R, f(x) = ‖x‖1−n2Kn
2−1(‖x‖), is:
F {f(x)} (s) = (2pi)
n
2
1 + ρ2
,
where x ∈ Rn, ρ = ‖s‖2, and Kk(x) is the modified Bessel
function of the second kind.
The integrals are formulated using spherical coordinates
and, then, symbolically evaluated with Mathematica 10.0. For
an non-automated evaluation of the expressions, we refer the
reader to MathWorld [21] and references therein, and integral
look-up tables [22].
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